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THE MINORITIES OF CHINA 





Though minorities constitute only 8.4% of the 
current population of the People’s Republic of 
China, they played an important role in China’s 
emergence as a nation-state. As they also occupy 
60% of China’s landmass in strategic peripheral 
areas, minorities are crucial to China’s future. 
These non-Han peoples of China are 
known as Minority Nationalities (shaoshu minzu 
少數民族 ), a concept based on the Stalinist 
notion of nacional’nost’: a group with a common 
language, territory, socioeconomic basis and 
psychological makeup. (The latter criterion was 
in practice defined so broadly as to include cus-
toms and even ancestry.) In addition to the 
majority Han Chinese Nationality, today 55 
Minority Nationalities enjoy official recognition. 
Not all of China’s minorities have re-
ceived official recognition; some distinct ethnic 
groups have been lumped together under one 
Nationality. Though some scholars have argued 
that non-dominant Han groups should also be 
considered minorities, in both China and Tai-
wan, the term “minority” refers exclusively to 
groups other than the Han Chinese.  
Chinese attitudes towards non-Han 
peoples have been strongly dichotomized over 
the centuries. These views have evolved from an 
empire-vs.-barbarians dichotomy to a paternalis-
tic more/less-advanced division of China’s citi-
zens. Official policy maintains that each ethnic 
group should have the right to develop its own 
culture and language, though integration remains 
a key goal. The degree of national integration of 
minorities varies widely. Some groups, such as 
the Zhuang and Koreans, are well integrated; 
others, such as the Tibetans and Uyghurs, retain 
a strong sense of separate cultural identity. 
 
2. Modern populations, locales, and econ-
omy 
 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the 
world’s most populous country, with over 1.25 
billion citizens (1998), 160 million of which are 
officially minorities. The largest minority groups 
(with figures in millions from the 2000 census) 
are Zhuang (16.2), Manchu (10.7), Hui (i.e. Mus-
lim Chinese, 9.8), Miao (7.4), Uyghurs (8.4), Yi 
(7.8), Tujia (8.0), Mongols (5.8), and Tibetans 
(5.4). Administratively, China is comprised of 23 
provinces (including, according to the PRC go-
vernment, Taiwan), five municipalities; minori-
ties occupy most of China’s border areas, largely 
in five minority Autonomous Regions and close 
to 200 minority Autonomous Counties.  
On the island of Taiwan (historically a 
part of China and known as the Republic of 
China), the 20 different Austronesian minority 
groups constitute less than 2% of Taiwan’s 
population (433,689 in 2002). 
The People’s Republic of China has a 
Gross Domestic Product per citizen of $750; on 
Taiwan, the figure is $12,333 (1998). The poor-
est areas of China are Tibet, Gansu, southern 
Xinjiang, and Guangxi: all largely minority areas. 
Half of the counties officially listed as the poor-
est in China are in minorities; fully 80% of those 
without adequate food and clothing are in mi-
nority areas. The standard of living for most 
minorities rose in the 1990s; the average annual 
income in Autonomous minority areas rose 
from 2040 to 6822 yuan (402 to 1653 yuan in 
rural areas, not adjusted for inflation). However, 
inequalities widened, with the average income of 
largely Han cities in minority areas was generally 
six times that of largely minority towns and rural 
areas (e.g. in Xinjiang, 8846 yuan in the Han oil 
town of Karamay vs. 1223 yuan in Kashgar). 
Some minority areas are rich in natural 
resources, such as Xinjiang (oil, natural gas, mi-
nerals) and Manchuria (coal). Though local peo-
ple have indirectly benefited from the infrastruc-
tural development such as railroad and highway 
construction associated with the extraction of 
these resources, most of the jobs are given to 
non-minorities, particularly at the management 
level. The low population density of minority 
areas is seen as another resource, and has lead to 
the optional subsidized migration and manda-
tory resettlement of millions of Chinese to 
Yunnan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia. 
Since 2000, China has actively implemented a 
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plan to develop the Western Regions: Shaanxi, 
Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Qinghai, Gansu, 
and the five Autonomous Regions.  
Since the early 1980s, ethnotourism has 
been an increasingly important part of the mi-
nority area economies. The mystiques of the Silk 
Road, Genghis Khan, and Tibetan Buddhism 
have drawn overseas and Chinese tourists alike 
to Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet, respec-
tively. Between 1990-1999, income from foreign 
tourists rose from 12 to 85.8 million dollars.  
 
3. The “Barbarians” and Imperial China: a 
History of Han & non-Han relations 
 
The majority Han Chinese civilization has a 
4000-year history as attested in the so-called 
oracle bone inscriptions. Though non-Han peo-
ples do not have such early written records, 
archaeological and linguistic evidence of cultural 
contact suggest that a variety of human groups 
lived within the territory that is today China. 
  Chinese civilization originated along the 
lowest reaches of the Yellow River and expan-
ded to the north and west to the Loess plateau, 
and south to the coasts. From the earliest Shang 
dynasty (18-12th c. BCE) to the end of the impe-
rial system in 1911, Chinese imperial strength 
and the size of its territory expanded and shrank 
along with the fortunes of the Empire. Until 
around 1000 CE, non-Han peoples of the region 
were quite autonomous. During times when the 
Han Chinese dynasties were weak, non-Han 
peoples raided and even sometimes conquered 
the Chinese territories. These non-Chinese peo-
ples often partially adopted Han Chinese titles 
(such as emperor), dress, and even language, but 
required all citizens to submit to some of their 
own practices (such as the obligatory queue –
hair braid – for men during the Manchu Qing 
dynasty). Most of these non-Han dynasties were 
short-lived, but not all: the last, the Manchu 
Qing dynasty, lasted from 1644 until 1911. 
Other significant “foreign (minority) dynasties” 
included the Hsiung-nu, a Central Asian steppe 
people, who ruled northern China between 311-
589, and the Mongol Yuan dynasty 1280-1368 
CE. Both the Mongol Yuan and the Manchu 
Qing dynasties significantly expanded Chinese 
territory, and also resulted in an ever-more mul-
ticultural empire. The five major civilizations 
within the Chinese territory were implicitly rec-
ognized in the 17th-18th century publication the 
Pentaglot Dictionary 五體清文鑑 in Manchu, 
Tibetan, Mongolian, Uyghur, and Chinese.  
Those peoples on the periphery of the empire 
whose language and culture differed from that 
of the ruling were considered barbarians. Ironi-
cally, even “foreign dynasty” rulers such as Man-
chus and Mongols were not immune to such 
views. Written records generally termed the 
peoples to the north and west hu 胡 (which we 
may call ‘northern barbarian’), while those to the 
south were known as Yi 夷 or Man 蠻 ‘Southern 
Barbarians’; indigenous peoples of Taiwan were 
often termed Dong Di 東氐 or Dong Fan 東番 
‘Eastern Savages.’  
 
4. Premodern Chinese Nationalism and 
non-Han groups 
 
Since the mid-19th century, Chinese nationalistic 
identity coalesced around the concept of a Han 
nationality, whose population spoke Sinitic lan-
guages (i.e. Chinese “dialects”). The equation of 
Chinese with Han provided another good rea-
son to overthrow the “foreign” Manchu Qing 
dynasty at the end of the 19th century. After the 
1911 Revolution by Chinese Nationalists, Sun 
Yat-Sen used minzu in the sense of ‘nation-state,’ 
thus extending the notion of Zhonghua minzu 
‘Chinese Nationality’ to include all major groups 
within the Chinese territory. Many historians 
consider this broadened definition simply due to 
territorial considerations.  
The phrase shaoshu minzu ‘Minority Na-
tionality,’ first used by the Nationalist leader Sun 
Yat-sen in 1924, took on a more prominent role 
in the inclusive rhetoric of the Communist Party 
during the Civil War in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Though the Communist message was overtly 
egalitarian to recruit all peoples, Minority Na-
tionalities were consistently referred to in 
paternalistic terms: the Party would help ruoxiao 
minzu ‘weak and small nationalities’ and luohou 
minzu ‘backward nationalities.’ Such terms reflect 
the social Darwinist thinking that prevailed at 
the time, which implicitly advocated the cultural 
assimilation of ethnic groups into the “more 
advanced” Han state.  
The term xiongdi minzu ‘brother nation-
ality’ was also introduced and is still used today. 
In the compound word xiongdi (lit. ‘elder:bro-
ther-younger:brother’), it is clear that by ‘elder 
brother’ the ‘more civilized’ Hans are meant, 
while the ‘younger brothers’ are all other peo-
ples. Though this ‘Han chauvinism’ has been 
denounced since the Communist Revolution, 
the Han people are expected to assist the mi-
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norities in economic, social and cultural deve-
lopment. 
 
5. The Communist Revolution and Nation-
ality Identification 
 
Since 1 October 1949 the government has been 
a socialist people’s republic, founded by Mao 
Zedong. Policy on minorities during the 1950s 
was strongly influenced both by Soviet Nation-
ality policies as well as Russian ethnographic 
theories. The PRC Common Programme (in-
terim constitution) of 1949 is egalitarian, 
asserting that all Nationalities were equal, and 
that Nationalities each had the “freedom to 
develop their dialects and languages, and to 
preserve or reform their traditional customs, and 
religious beliefs” (Articles 50 & 53). In theory, 
then, the Han is but one of many ethnic groups, 
each of whose culture and language should be 
respected. The People’s Republic of China initi-
ated a two-pronged process to identify 
Nationalities and reinforce this concept into the 
public consciousness. First, teams of linguists 
were sent out all over China to investigate that 
status of ethnolinguistic groups; second, any 
group considering itself to be a Nationality was 
encouraged to formally petition for recognition. 
Already by 1955, more than 400 groups had 
applied for recognition, 200 alone in southwest-
ern Yunnan province. In the subsequent two 
years, the Central government’s State Ethnic 
Affairs Commission formally declared 55 Na-
tionalities, using the Stalinist criteria for Natio-
nalities to evaluate data from the research teams. 
Political considerations were a factor in many 
decisions as well. Only one group, the Tibeto-
Burman Jinuo of Yunnan, has since successfully 
petitioned (in 1979) to be added to the list. 
Many others, lumped together under one over-
arching Nationality name, have tried unsuccess-
fully to gain official recognition.  
Some scholars outside China have sug-
gested that some Han Chinese subgroups con-
stitute minorities, particularly the Yue speakers 
(of which Canton is a part) and the Hakkas. 
Both meet most of the criteria for Nationality 
status, having a unique territory, identity, and 
language varieties unintelligible to speakers of 
the Standard Language. Yet Hakkas and Yue 
speakers share the Chinese writing system and 
consider themselves Chinese, so they are classi-
fied as Han; to classify them as separate groups 
would directly counter the aims of the unified 
modern Chinese nation-state.  
 
6. Regional political autonomy, in theory 
 
The Central Government then established areas 
with over 30% Minority Nationalities autono-
mous organs of self-government. The National 
Minority Regional Autonomy Law adopted in 
1984 provides specific guidelines for minority 
regional autonomy through the People’s Con-
gress and Governments. These included five 
Autonomous Regions (Inner Mongolia, founded 
on 1 May 1947; Xinjiang Uygur, 1 October 
1955; Guangxi Zhuang, 15 March 1958; Ningxia 
Hui, 25 October 1958; and Tibet, 1 September 
1965), 30 Autonomous Prefectures and 120 
Autonomous Counties (including three “ban-
ners”), in addition to more than 1,300 
Autonomous Townships. Typically, the chair or 
vice-chair of the People’s Congress Standing 
Committee in each Autonomous area is a mem-
ber of the eponymous Minority Nationality; 
minority-cadre representation in the national 
People’s Congress was over 14% in 2003, a 
significant rise from 6.6% in 1990.  
National minority Autonomous area gov-
ernments are by law empowered to enact 
legislation appropriate to local political, eco-
nomic and cultural conditions; enact local 
holidays; independently control local revenue, 
and manage infrastructural and social-welfare 
projects. 
In practice, the control of the Central Gov-
ernment and of the Han Nationality is strongly 
felt in minority Autonomous areas. Though the 
Autonomous area Committee chair is usually a 
member of the Autonomous area nationality 
(e.g. a Tibetan in Tibet), the vice-chair tends to 
wield real power, and he is invariably Han Chi-
nese. To maintain the integrity of the state, the 
Central Government in Beijing frequently issues 
directives to Autonomous area governments. 
Between 1979 and 1989, China encouraged 
increased autonomy in designated minority areas 
and allowed a cultural and religious revival in 
Han and minority areas alike. This trend towards 
openness came to an end, however, when the 
central government decided that cultural, reli-
gious and especially political expression was 
becoming a threat to the unity of the Chinese 
state. This resulted not only in the 1989 sup-
pression of pro-democracy demonstrators in 
Tiananmen Square, but also the arrests of al-
leged separatists in minority Autonomous Re-
gions in the 1990s. Martial law-like conditions 
were imposed in Tibet and Xinjiang from 1997 
onwards as a means of stemming violent pro-
tests from separatists. Furthermore, controls on 
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religious expression (see Religion, below) were 
re-introduced for all citizens of China. Still, it 
can be argued that this hardened minority policy 
is relatively unchanged since 1949. The govern-
ment’s message to the minorities is clear: as long 
as you play by our rules and support the Chinese 
state, we will help you develop and integrate.  
To facilitate this development, China has 
enacted two types of preferential policies to-
wards its National Minorities: university en-
trance quotas and family policies. 
 
7. Preferential Policies for National Minori-
ties: Education 
 
China has made great strides in its goal of a 
universal nine years of education for its citizens, 
but the introduction of school fees in the 1990s 
meant that the poorest families no longer could 
afford to send their children to school. This has 
affected a disproportionate number of minori-
ties. Still, the number of National Minority 
schoolchildren and teachers has steadily in-
creased since the 1950s. Ideally, pupils are 
taught in their native language and Chinese from 
primary school onwards. In practice, minority-
language education is offered only in areas with 
significant minority populations, and then only 
if the language has an official writing system: 
Korean, Uyghur, Tibetan, Mongolian, Yi, and 
Dai. Even if largely symbolic, this support of 
minority-language education by the central gov-
ernment far exceeded that of the former Soviet 
government for its minority languages. It has, in 
addition, supplied the national minority 
autonomous areas with large quantities of finan-
cial aid and material resources. As a result, the 
percentage of minority students at tertiary insti-
tutions increased between 1978-1992, declining 
from the mid 1990s onwards after the imposi-
tion of university fees. 
Nonetheless, interest in bilingual educa-
tion has waned in recent years, as many minority 
parents see economic advantages in having their 
children learn Chinese from an early age. At the 
tertiary level, minority-region universities have 
reduced minority-language courses or aban-
doned them altogether (e.g. Xinjiang University 
in 2002). Previously, minorities studying in the 
minority language would attend an extra “prepa-
ratory” year of university, but only receive credit 
for four years; moreover, these students had 
difficulty finding employment upon graduation. 
At the tertiary level, China recognized 
early on the need to train minority cadres, teach-
ers, and technicians. In 2001, the Law on Regional 
Autonomy was amended to improve recruitment 
of National Minorities to government positions. 
From the 1950s, the central government, under 
the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, estab-
lished institutes of tertiary education specifically 
for National Minorities: the Central Nationalities 
Institute (now University) in Beijing (est. 1951), 
and 12 regional Nationalities Institutes. Attend-
ing these institutions is lower prestige than 
national universities.  
Despite preferential admissions stan-
dards, minorities are underrepresented in the 
national universities (6% at Beijing University, 
for example). Nonetheless, the use of preferen-
tial quotas (e.g. in Inner Mongolia) and differen-
tial exam requirements (e.g. in Xinjiang) was a 
significant equalizing factor in education, allow-
ing 187,000 minority students to attend post-
secondary institutions in 1995-96. The central 
government views the post-secondary education 
of minorities as an integral part of the overall 
economic and cultural development of minority 
regions: those sent to national universities as 
ethnic minority classes (minzu ban), as well as a 
number of those at Nationalities Institutes, are 
required to sign contracts pledging to return to 
their home region.  
  
8. Preferential Policies: Family Planning 
 
Preferential policies on marriage and family 
planning vary from region to region in China. 
Generally, minorities may marry two years ear-
lier than Han Chinese, for whom the minimum 
age is 20 for males and 18 for females. Though 
China implemented a one-child-per-family pol-
icy in 1980 to stem its explosive population 
growth, officially recognized minorities are par-
tially exempt. Those in urban areas have been 
allowed two children (or three if both are girls 
or one is disabled); those in rural areas, generally 
three. In contrast, the Han Chinese are allowed 
two in rural areas. Violations of these limits 
result in monetary penalties, which are decided 
locally. A first violation might cost 1000 yuan 
($120) – two months’ income for the average 
citizen – whereas a second violation could cost 
up to ten times that amount. Nonetheless, larger 
families are common in remote rural areas, due 
to the need for farm hands and a general prefer-
ence for male children. 
  
9. Religion  
 
The dominant religions of China are Daoism, 
Buddhism, and folk religion. For many minori-
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ties, professing a religious belief distinct from 
that of the Hans has been a vital means of main-
taining identity.  
The PRC government discouraged relig-
ion but did not ban it outright, except for the 
disastrous period of the so-called Cultural Revo-
lution, 1966-78. Then, most places of worship, 
be they Buddhist monasteries, Daoist temples, 
Muslim mosques or Christian churches, were 
closed or destroyed and the clergy forced into 
labor. From 1978 to the early 1990s, religious 
observance was quietly renewed and expanded 
by many ethnic groups including the Han; a 
number of temples, monasteries, mosques, and 
churches were built or refurbished during this 
period. From the mid-1990s on, however, in-
creasing political restrictions in minority areas 
were accompanied by increasing censure of reli-
gion by the central government. Party members 
have never been allowed to openly practice 
religion. Chinese minorities represent a wide 
spectrum of religious belief:  
 
Islam. With 20 million adherents in China, Islam 
is the largest minority religion. Besides the Chi-
nese-speaking Hui, most are speakers of Turkic 
languages in western China are Muslims: Uy-
ghurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Tatar, Uzbek, Salar, 
and some Mongolic groups (Baonan and 
Dongxiang), and the so-called Tajiks (more 
accurately Sarikoli and Wakhi). 
  
Buddhism. Most Buddhist minorities are Lamaists 
(i.e. Tibetan Buddhists, 1.3 million), overwhelm-
ingly Tibeto-Burman (Tibetans, Naxi, Mosuo 
(officially also Naxi)) and Mongolic peoples 
(Mongols, Dagurs, Eastern Yugur). The Dai are 
primarily Hinayana Buddhists.  
 
Folk Religion. Many ethnic groups have animist 
practices, at least historically; most of the Altaic 
peoples (Turkic, Mongolic, and Manchu-
Tungusic speakers) have a long history of em-
ploying trance mediums. Those groups still 
preserving more active animist and shamanist 
practices include the Mongolic Dagur and 
Monguor (Tu), the Tungusic Ewenki and Oro-
chen, the Hani, the Naxi, the Mosuo, and some 
Austronesian groups on Taiwan. In addition, 
most all minorities within the Chinese cultural 
sphere of influence practice ancestor worship, 
including Muslim Chinese. 
 
Polytheism. Polytheism is attributed to a number 
of minority groups in southwestern and south-
ern China, including the Yao, Yi, Zhuang, and 
Hani Nationalities. Often, polytheism is com-
prised of a syncretic system of worship, which 
includes local elements, Chinese religious ele-
ments, and external religious elements. For 
example, the Hani groups, Tibeto-Burman peo-
ples of Yunnan and Guizhou provinces, are 
subject to an number of spirits of natural topog-
raphy and the weather, of heaven and earth, and 
of the underworld. While Buddhism and Dao-
ism, interpreted as Chinese polytheism, have 
made some inroad, Christianity has had little 
impact in these regions.  
 
Christianity. Christianity was introduced in waves 
from the ninth century onwards, though it was 
adopted by only a few minority group members 
in China. Presbyterian and Catholic missionaries 
on Taiwan in the 19th century, however, man-
aged to convert up to 70% of the indigenous 
peoples there. In the PRC, Catholic communica-
tion with the Vatican is frowned upon.  
 
Judaism. The oldest Jewish community was in 
Kaifeng, Henan province, where a synagogue 
and a sizeable population flourished from at 
least the 12th century CE until the synagogue’s 
demolition in 1860. These Jews were over-
whelmingly assimilated. During the19th century, 
smaller immigrant Jewish communities existed 
in Shanghai and Harbin. During the mid-1980s, 
intellectuals who knew themselves to be de-
scended from Jews near Kaifeng contemplated 
petitioning for recognition as a Minority Na-
tionality. Such a move was not viewed favorably 
by the PRC government, and today Chinese 
Jews, some of whom are re-learning traditions 
of their ancestors, are generally discouraged 
from publicly discussing their heritage. 
 
10. Survey by Geographic Region 
 
National minorities are concentrated on China’s 
peripheries, except for the Muslim Chinese Hui 
and to a lesser extent the Manchus, who are 
found throughout China (though still concen-
trated in the Northwest and Northeast, 
respectively). 
The minorities of North China are tra-
ditionally pastoral nomads with hierarchically 
structured societies. Historically, due to their 
nomadic life and powers of archery, these no-
mads regularly established vast but short-lived 
empires. These included the forerunners of the 
modern northern Chinese minorities, such as 
the Huns, Kitan, Jurchen, Mongols and Man-
chus.  
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The Northeast: Manchuria 
 
Northeastern China, which includes Heilongji-
ang, Jilin, and Liaoning provinces, is part of a 
temperate forest and taiga ecology that today is a 
farming area. The western part of Manchuria 
falls today within the Inner Mongolian region. 
Though the area today is heavily settled by Han 
agriculturalists and plays host to China’s Rust 
Belt, it is home to some 20-30 groups and sub-
groups, many of them Tungusic. The largest of 
these is the Manchu group (Manju, in Chinese 
Man), who ruled China as the foreign Qing dy-
nasty from 1644-1911. By the end of that dynas-
ty, most Manchus were so well integrated into 
Chinese society that they rapidly lost their lan-
guage. Today, the Manchu language is virtually 
extinct, except for a handful of speakers in Man-
churia and, significantly, a group sent to western 
Jungaria in 1763-1765, which today is located in 
the Yili Valley of Xinjiang and known as the 
Sibe (Ch. Xibo, pop.188,824 in 2000). Though 
most all Manchus today speak Chinese, the 
number of Manchus in the country has soared 
to 10.7 million in 2000, as people recognize the 
benefits of preferential minority policies.  
The remaining minority population 
consists of small pockets of Tungusic and Mon-
golic peoples. The Tungusic groups, who were 
traditionally reindeer herders, consist of the Na-
nay (in Chinese Hezhen, pop. 4640, including the 
Nanay, Kili, Ulcha, and Orok groups); Evenki 
(including the Orochen (Ch. Elunchun, pop. 
8196), Solon (Ch. Ewenke, pop. 30,505), and 
Negidal groups); the Udege (including the 
Oroch, Taz, and Kyakalas). Many of these had 
extended contact with Mongolic peoples con-
centrated in western Manchuria: the Khamni-
gan, Buryat, and Bargut Mongols, as well as 
Dagur. All of the latter Mongolic speakers ex-
cept the Dagur (Ch. Dawuer, 132,394) are of-
ficially classified as one Mongolian group (Meng-
gu). Up to 900 Khakas (i.e. South Siberian Tur-
kic) are found in Manchuria, though their spea-
kers number less than a dozen. Nearly two 
million Koreans inhabit Manchuria and have 
limited schooling and media available in their 
language. 
 
Northern Inner Asia: Inner Mongolia 
 
Mongolic peoples today are found from the 
Outer Mongolia in the north, through Inner 
Mongolia to the Ordos area of Yellow River, 
and westwards to the Jungarian Basin. From the 
20th c. onwards, Mongolic peoples have found 
themselves on two sides of an international bor-
der, both in China and also Mongolia (which 
declared independence in 1921, became the 
People’s Republic of Mongolia in 1924 and had 
strong ties to the USSR until democratization in 
1989). After 1950, the pastoral Mongolic popu-
lation became largely sedentarized with the mas-
sive influx of Han Chinese farmers, who came 
to outnumber Mongols 5:1 in most areas. Offi-
cially, the arid steppe plateau of the Inner Mon-
golian Autonomous Region is populated by 
“Mongols” (`Menggu) including Buryat and Bar-
gu (in the northeast), Oyrat (in the west and 
Xinjiang), Alaa (northwest), Chakhar (central), 
and Khorchin in the south. Desertification due 
to farming and demographic pressure is a major 
issue.  
 
Western Inner Asia: Xinjiang 
 
Xinjiang, the ‘New Dominion’ (or ‘Eastern Tur-
kestan’) has long been a crossroads of 
civilizations due to its oases midway along the 
arid “Silk Route.” The 13 recognized Nationali-
ties of the Xinjiang Uygur [sic] Autonomous 
Region are predominantly Turkic peoples. The 
nomadic or historically nomadic groups (Kazakh 
(pop. 1.25 million, 2000), Kirghiz (0.16 m.), 
Mongol (Kalmyk Oyrat, ca. 110,000) inhabit the 
central and northern mountain areas around the 
Jungarian Basin; the agriculturalists (Uyghur, 
Uzbek (0.012 m.), and now Han and Muslim 
Chinese (Hui)) inhabit the oases ringing the 
Tarim Basin in the south, as well as the Yili 
valley in the west. As in Inner Mongolia, the 
immigration of Han Chinese in the last 50 years 
has resulted in a changed demographic, with 
38.7% of the population of 18 million Han Chi-
nese, 46.5% Uyghur and 14.8% other, not 
including at least one million Chinese troops 
and ca. 100,000 itinerant laborers. Shortages of 
arable land and especially water due to this im-
migration have resulted in widespread unease 
with Chinese rule, which occasionally turns 
violent. The PRC’s concern that Uyghur separa-
tists will threaten China’s territorial integrity has 
resulted in intensified restrictions on religious 
organizations, alleging that some are linked with 
terrorists and Islamic fundamentalists. The vast 
territory is populated by a number of smaller 
groups, including Tuvans in the far north (who 
are officially Mongols), modern Manchu speak-
ers known as Sibe in the west, and Iranic 
peoples in the southwest (Sarikoli and Wakhi), 
as well as small populations of Russians, Tatars, 
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and Ainus (Abdal, who speak a Uyghur-Iranic 
jargon). 
 
 Southern Inner Asia: Greater Tibet 
 
The area that is culturally and geographically 
Tibetan includes the Tibet Autonomous Region 
(TAR), western Sichuan, southern Gansu, and 
Qinghai provinces. It is an arid high plateau 
populated by nomadic herders and sedentary 
barley and wheat farmers. Predominant among 
all ethnic groups of the plateau are varieties of 
Tibetan Buddhism, which often coexist with 
folk religions and, along the northern periphery, 
Islam. The Tibetans proper (Ch. Zang) comprise 
three major dialect-cultural areas: Amdo in the 
northeast (pop. ca. 850,000), Central (Dbus-
gtsang, including Lhasa, 1.1 m. (1990)), and 
Khams in the east and north (1.5 m. (1994)). 
The designation Zang also includes a number of 
other unrecognized Tibeto-Burman groups, 
such as the Atuence, Groma, Nyarong, Gya-
rong, Deng, Lhomi, Panang, Tseku, and Tinan 
Lahul. Han immigration to the TAR has not 
been nearly has dramatic as elsewhere, though 
the Han population there has increased to 5.9% 
of the population (2000), excluding itinerant 
merchants and laborers. 
On the eastern periphery of the greater 
region are a number of largely pastoralist Ti-
beto-Burman speakers, such as the Qiang 
(Sichuan, pop. 306,000); Moinba (TAR, Ch. 
Menba, 8923); Lhoba (TAR, 2965) Bogar (south-
eastern TAR, 3000, classified as Lhoba), and the 
Nu (northwestern Yunnan, 28,759). One rather 
newly-discovered group, the Guichong of Si-
chuan, remains unclassified. 
Amdo (Northeastern) Tibet also in-
cludes other groups whose languages and cul-
tures are heavily influenced by the Amdo Tibe-
tans, such as the Muslim Mongolic-speaking 
Baonan, the Santa (Ch. Dongxiang), Enger/Shera 
Yugur (Ch. Dongbu Yugu), the Monguor (Ch. Tu), 





The Chinese Southwest, including Yunnan, 
Sichuan, Guizhou, and Guangxi provinces, is 
one of the most ethnically diverse of China. 
Many Tibeto-Burman peoples live in this area as 
well as representatives of the major ethnic 
groups of Southeast Asia: Tai-Kadai, Mon-
Khmer, Hmong-Mien, and many numerically 
smaller groups. The most populous minority 
groups include the Yi, Miao, Yao, and Zhuang. 
The area is mountainous, temperate in the north 
and tropical in the south. Ethnic tourism is 
popular here, despite the extreme poverty in the 




The Yi Nationality, a branch of Tibeto-Burman, 
encompasses a number of ethnic groups and up 
to 20 languages, which can be broadly classified 
into six ethnolinguistic regions: the northern 
standard in Sichuan (Xide), the Nuosu of the 
Sichuan-Yunnan border, those in central Yun-
nan (Lipo, Dayao and Nanhua), southeastern Yi 
in Yunnan (Ahi, Axi, and Sani), southern (Dian-
Qian) in Yunnan and Guizhou, and those in 
western Yunnan (Dongshan and Xishan). Yis 
today are still aware of their caste origins, which 
entailed a hierarchy of the aristocratic Black Yi, 
the former Han-slave White Yi, and recent for-
mer slaves. 
Independent agriculturalist Nationalities 
who speak an Yi-group Tibeto-Burman language 
include the Hani and Lisu; the diverse Hani 
(known as Akha in Thailand) have a population 
of 1.44 m. (2000), including three regional dia-
lects Ha-Ai, Bi-Kaw, and Hao-Bai; the Lisu 
(comprising the Anung and Che-nung) have a 
population of 634,912, and live in Yunnan and 
Sichuan. 
The Tibeto-Burman Naxi of northwest-
ern Yunnan, pop. 308,839 (2000), boast a 
unique ideographic writing system. The Mosuo 
(also classified as Naxi) practices matrilineal 
descent and ‘walking marriage.’ 
A separate branch of the Tibet-Burman 
languages is represented by Qiang (autonym 
Rma, pop. 306,072 (2000)), spoken from north-
western Sichuan to Yunnan. Both pastoralists 
and agriculturalists, the Qiang have maintained 
close contact with the Han and Zhuang. The 
Tibeto-Burman Prmi (Ch. Pumi), living near the 
Mosuo, number 33,600 and were long consid-
ered a branch of the Qiang peoples; they com-
prise three ethnolinguistic groups: Phzomi, 
Phzome, Tshomi. These pastoral peoples in-
habit northwestern Yunnan and practice both 
Tibetan Buddhism and polytheism. 
The Lahu (453,705, including Na, Ni, 
Shehleh) are another major subgroup of Tibeto-
Burman in Yunnan.  
The Bai of Yunnan and Guizhou (pop. 
1.86 m.) are difficult to classify, and the three 
dialects of Dali, Jianchuan, and Bijiang may be 
separate languages. They are likely a branch of 
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Tibeto-Burman and have had close contact with 
the Han. 
  Peoples of the Kachin subgroup include 
the Achang Nationality (pop. 27,708) and the 
closely related Jingpo (132,143, subgroup Guari 
and the unrelated Zaiwa) and Drung (Ch. Delong, 
7426) Nationalities. The rGyarong peoples of 
northwestern Sichuan, who number at least 
230,000 and include the Horpa, Jiarong, Shang-
zhai, and Guanyinqiao, are officially Tibetan. 
  One unclassified Himalyish Tibeto-
Burman group are the Baima of Yunnan (pop. 
110,000 (1995)). Finally, on the eastern edge of 
this region, in Guizhou, Hunan, and Hubei, are 
the agriculturalist Tujia. This group, though 
large, is largely assimilated to Han culture. 
 
Tai-Kadai (Zhuang-Dong) peoples 
 
 The eponymous Tai (Ch. Dai) is a huge group 
(pop. 1.16 m.) comprising three subgroups: Dai-
lu, Daina, and Daija. They inhabit tropical river 
valleys and are rice farmers. The northeastern-
most extension of Tai culture is represented by 
the Kam (Ch. Dong, pop. 2.96 m.) in Guizhou 
and Guangxi. Closely related independent Na-
tionalities in Guangxi and Guizhou include the 
agriculturalist Maonan (pop. 107,166), Mulam 
(Ch. Mulao, pop. 207,352), and Shui (or Sui, pop. 
406,902), and Gelao (0.58 m.). Other unrecog-
nized Tai-Kadai groups include the Buyang 
(officially Zhuang); Cun (officially Han); and 
Then (officially Buyi).  
The Zhuang, China’s largest Nationality 
(and includes the subgroups Gubei and Gui-
bian), live principally in the Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region. The Buyi, whose language 
is closely related to northern Zhuang, are classi-
fied as a separate Nationality and found 




Most of the Mon-Khmer peoples, part of the 
larger Austroasiatic family, are farmers. In Yun-
nan, the Blang (pop. 91,882) enjoy official 
recognition and are Theravada Buddhists; 
other officially recognized Yunnan frontier peo-
ples include the De’ang (a.k.a. Benlong, pop. 
17,935), and the Va (Ch. Wa incl. A-wa, Amok, 
pop. 0.40 m.). 
 
Hmong-Mien (Miao-Yao) peoples 
 
The Miao Nationality is closely related to the 
Hmongs of Southeast Asia, found in Guizhou, 
Sichuan and Guangxi. Chinese military cam-
paigns against the Miao in the 18-19th centuries 
resulted in 70 or more subgroups; within China 
alone, there are seven major ethnolinguistic 
groups with mutually unintelligible languages: 
Central (Chuanqiandian) Black, Red, White, Az-
ure, Flower, Grass. A closely related group is the 
Gelao(Guizhou, 0.58 m.) 
Yao (pop. 2.6 million) is another um-
brella term for four distinct ethnolinguistic 
groups; the Biao Min, Kim Mun, Mien, and Yao 
Min. Also includes the Tai-Kadai Yerong peo-
ple. Mixed hunting, foraging, and agriculture has 
resulted in their being spread throughout 
Guangxi, Hunan, Guangdong, Guizhou, and 
Yunnan. 
The Grass Miao (Cao Miao, Mjiuniang) 
and the Tea Mountain Yao (Chashan Yao, Lak-
kja), though classed as Miao-Yao, are 
linguistically Tai-Kadai speakers. 
 
The Southeast  
 
Though the Southeast is one of the most popu-
lous areas of China, the non-Han minority 
population is scant. The main exceptions are the 
peoples of Hainan island and the She National-
ity in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Guangxi (pop 0.7 
m.); the latter are related to the Miao but now 
speak Chinese. 
Hainan Island, off the coast of Guang-
dong province, became a province in 1988. It is 
home to Li (1.25 million, including Jiamao and 
Hlai, Tai-Kadai languages) who are agricultural-
ists living in tropical forest mountains at the 
center of Hainan island (include Bendi, Qi, Ha 
languages). Also represented are the Lingao 
(Ongbe, 0.5 m.) and the Chamic Tsat people 
(pop. 4500). The latter are Muslims, officially of 




Taiwan’s indigenous peoples, numbering 
433,689 in 2002, are Austronesian and boast a 
12,000 year history on the island. Though in the 
PRC all indigenous peoples on Taiwan are 
known as the Gaoshan Nationality, they com-
prise the following official indigenous groups: 
Atayal, Saisiyat, Bunun, Tsou, Paiwan, Rukai, 
Puyuma, Ami, Shao (newly classified in 2002), 
and Yami. At least eleven assimilated groups 
who once lived on the western plains of Taiwan 
have been subsumed under the cover term 
Pingpu. Those dwelling in the mountains or east 
coast have better resisted assimilation. 
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The indigenous peoples of Taiwan 
(ROC) were formerly called shanbao 山 胞 
‘mountain compatriots,’ but this pejorative term 
was replaced in 1994 by yuanzhumin 原住民
’indigenous peoples.’ The National Assembly 
also passed Additional Articles to the ROC 
Constitution which accorded indigenous people 
equal legal status, the right to political participa-
tion, and “...assistance and encouragement for 
their education, cultural preservation, social 
welfare, and business undertakings.”  
In 1996, the national government estab-
lished the Council of Aboriginal Affairs; 
minority rights to participate in educational 
policies and reforms were guaranteed in the 
Aboriginal Education Act of 1998. Nine seats in 
the Legislative are reserved for indigenous peo-
ples. Finally, an aboriginal school of ethnology 
(the College of Indigenous Studies, Donghuan 
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